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1. Introduction 
 Globalization is the dominant economic phenomenon of the last thirty years. 
Openness in trade, investment and financial flows has grown dramatically.  Inequalities 
within countries have also increased significantly during this period.1  The natural 
question to ask is whether there is a connection between the two.  To what extent can the 
increase in inequality be explained by globalization?  And if there is a connection, what if 
anything can and should be done about it? 
 
 Any exploration of inequality must begin by specifying inequality of what and 
inequality between whom.  The focus in this essay will be on income inequality, although 
quite often measurement will be confined to inequality of consumption expenditure.  As 
for inequality between whom, this can be between all individuals in the world, between 
nations, between individuals within nations, or between broad groupings within the 
nation.  The focus of this paper is inequality within developing nations.  However, this is 
in no way to suggest that globalization is unimportant to inequality in developed 
countries.  Evidence from developed countries will also be referred to as relevant 
throughout this paper.  The inequality considered will be between individuals primarily, 
but inequality between broadly defined groups within the nation (spatial, and gender)—
will also be discussed.  The measure of inequality, which determines what aspect of the 
income distribution is being emphasized, is also a relevant consideration.  For the most 
part this paper will consider general measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient. 
 
 A simple framework for linking income distribution and globalization is to write 
income as derived from different assets and the return on those assets, plus net transfers. 
The transfers can be further disaggregated into private and public transfers.  Assets can 
be disaggregated into the basic factors such as land, labor and capital, although further 
disaggregation, especially of labor between different skill levels, is also sometimes 
useful.  The assets of an individual are therefore the capital and land she owns, plus the 
human capital embodied in her labor power.  The evolution of income distribution can 
then be decomposed into the evolution of assets, the evolution of rates of return to these 
assets, and the evolution of public and private transfers. 
 
 As noted above, different economic dimensions of globalization can be measured 
by increases in trade, investment, financial flows and migration across national borders. 
These are of course outcome variables, determined by more fundamental causal variables 
such as natural endowment differences between nations and national and global policy. 
The literature often slips into the practice of labeling increase in trade for example as the 
causal factor whose consequences for inequality need to be investigated.  This paper will 
not be immune from this tendency, but the caveat must always be borne in mind. 
 
 The focus of the large and still growing literature which looks to uncover the links 
between globalization and inequality is primarily through the effects of globalization on 
rates of return to assets, holding fixed the asset distributions.  Even when assets are 
                                                 
1 Chapter 10 of this volume covers trends in income inequality in developing and emerging economies, 
while Chapter 9 is devoted to inequality trends in developed countries. 
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considered as mobile, the focus is on the impact of this mobility on returns to assets 
rather than on the distribution of assets.  Within the analysis of returns, the literature is 
structured around gaps in returns to capital as a whole and labor as a whole, and around 
the gaps in returns to skilled and unskilled labor. The underlying assumption is that a 
widening in these gaps will increase interpersonal inequality as measured through 
standard indices such as the Gini coefficient.  Since individuals who get their income 
primarily from capital generally have higher incomes than those who get their income 
primarily from labor, and since skilled individuals generally have higher incomes than 
unskilled individuals, this is not an unreasonable assumption to make.  But it is 
nevertheless worth emphasizing that in much of the literature an analysis of inequality is 
replaced by an analysis of differentials in returns to capital and to labor at different skill 
levels. 
 
 Once the market distribution of income is determined, public and private transfers 
will contribute to the outcome of the final income distribution.  These can be equally 
important as determinants of inequality, and globalization can affect them as well. First, 
international remittances, a natural consequence of international migration, can affect 
inequality in developing countries.  Second, the greater ability of capital and high income 
labor to cross borders can also have an impact on the progressivity of public tax and 
transfer regimes, and thus on final inequality.  This channel from globalization to 
Inequality also needs to be considered. 
 
 With this background, the structure and plan of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 
begins with the state of play in the three decades after the Second World War, from the 
1950s through to the 1970s.  The focus here will be on how the distributional predictions 
of the Hecksher-Ohlin model, particularly the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, meshed with 
the great policy debates of the time, especially around the significance of the East Asian 
experience.  These economies delivered a “growth with equity” miracle in a regime of 
trade openness, at a time when other economies with import substitution regimes were 
either stagnating with low growth rates (like India) or were growing but with high and 
rising levels of inequality (like Brazil).  This experience was consistent with the 
prediction that in economies which were abundant in unskilled labor, opening up would 
lead to a narrowing of the gap between unskilled labor on the one hand, and skilled labor 
and capital on the other.  The East Asian experience was crucial in informing the debate, 
and in persuading the International Financial Institutions and in turn many developing 
country governments to open out their economies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
 Section 3 provides a thumb nail sketch of the evolution of within country 
inequality in the last three decades of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, with a particular focus 
on the impact of openness.  The bottom line is that openness seems to have been 
associated with increases in pre-transfer inequality.  Clearly, this pattern from the 1980s 
onwards questions the validity of the basic Hecksher-Ohlin framework in explaining the 
inequality consequences of trade, especially since inequality rose both in economies that 
were relatively labor abundant and in those that were relatively labor scarce.  The section 
then turns to a range of new theories, particularly those emphasizing heterogeneity of 
workers and firms, and market based selection effects intensified by trade.  Such a 
 
 
6
perspective, it turns out, is more successful in explaining the stylized facts of openness 
and inequality in the last three decades. 
 
 Sections 2 and 3 focus on a particular notion of openness (greater levels of trade 
and cross-border investment), a particular entry point to income distribution (differential 
rates of return to broadly defined factors of production), and a particular notion of 
inequality (between persons within nations).  These are of course major strands in the 
literature.  However, the remaining sections of the paper take up a number of extensions, 
modifications and generalizations which have developed in the last few years from this 
base. 
 
 Section 4 focuses on an aspect of globalization that became prominent with the 
East Asian crisis in 1997, and occupied policy makers’ thinking strongly in the 2008 
global financial crisis.  How do crises induced by globalization of financial flows affect 
inequality within countries?  There is a significant literature that has developed on this 
topic, based on country studies and global analysis, for the crises of the 1990s and the 
2000s.  This section will review this literature and take stock. 
 
Section 5 takes up a particular dimension of inequality—gender inequality.  This 
is an important aspect of inequality in its own right, with a substantial and significant 
literature focusing specifically on globalization and gender inequality.  For example, the 
Bangladesh garment sector or the Mexican maquiladoras employ women 
disproportionately, and there is heated debate about the conditions of work in these 
sectors and whether the women are better off here compared to the best alternative.  The 
empirical literature matches the policy debate, supporting both sides of the argument, and 
will bear a systematic review to draw out the main analytical issues and “centre of 
gravity” of the conclusions. 
 
Section 6 addresses a dimension of inequality that is prominent in the policy 
discourse—spatial inequality within a country.  This can be seen merely as component or 
a contributor to interpersonal inequality, but doing so would miss important recent 
analytical and policy strands in the literature—for example, on how agglomeration 
economies interact with openness, or the political economy of uneven development 
within a country. 
 
Section 7 begins the assessment of openness, transfers and inequality by looking 
at private transfers through remittances.  But it also takes up the more general question of 
the impact of international migration on inequality in developing countries.  Can 
migration and remittances exacerbate domestic inequality?  There is some evidence that it 
can, and this may be a contributory factor in the association between global integration 
and within country inequality.  
 
Section 8 then moves to public transfers and public policy in general, and asks 
how greater mobility of capital and skilled labor in particular may constrain governments 
from pursuing progressive tax and transfer policies, with consequences for inequality in 
the final distribution of income.  This section also takes up the more general question of 
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international coordination of public policy to address the impact of openness on 
inequality. 
 
Section 9 concludes the paper with suggestions for areas of further research.  A 
final caveat is in order, however.  This chapter is about globalization and inequality, and 
the focus is naturally on the links from globalization to inequality.  As such it may 
sometimes give the impression that globalization is the main factor behind inequality 
increase.  There are of course other forces affecting inequality, and trade and capital 
flows may not even be the most important factors, although they surely interact with and 
influence a range of structural and policy influences on inequality. 
 
 
2. Immediate Post-war Theories, Predictions and Evidence 
 
 Although economic historians have been interested in the links between 
globalization and inequality in the 19th and early 20th centuries2, we begin this essay by 
considering the first three decades after the Second World War.  At the start of the period, 
much of the development literature was focused away from global opportunities.  It was 
either concerned primarily with domestic processes to the neglect of the global context, 
or was suspicious of international trade, investment and capital flows. 
 
 An example of a theory of development which was isolated from global forces is 
the classic Lewis (1954) surplus labor perspective. In the first part of this paper a pure 
closed economy is analyzed and development is seen in terms of drawing labor away 
from the traditional surplus labor sector towards modern capitalist forms of production, a 
process which continues until labor becomes scarce and its wage starts rising.  
 
 What is interesting and not very well appreciated, however, is that the Lewis 
(1954) paper was in two parts.  Part II of the paper deals with the open economy in the 
phase when surplus labor is exhausted: 
 
“When capital accumulation catches up with the labour supply, wages begin to 
rise above the subsistence level, and the capitalist surplus is adversely affected.  
However, if there is still surplus labour in other countries, the capitalists can avoid this in 
one of two ways, by encouraging immigration or by exporting their capital to countries 
where there is still abundant labour at a subsistence wage.” 
 
Lewis carries out detailed analysis of a number of archetypical cases of trade and 
investment.  Among his conclusions are the following: 
 
 “The export of capital reduces capital formation at home, and so keeps wages 
down.  This is offset if the capital export cheapens the things which workers import, or 
raises wage costs in competing countries.  But it is aggravated if the capital export raises 
the cost of imports or reduces costs in competing countries……The importation of 
foreign capital does not raise real wages in countries which have surplus labour, unless 
                                                 
2 See for example Lindert and Williamson (2001) 
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the capital results in increased productivity in the commodities which they produce for 
their own consumption…. The Law of Comparative Costs is just as valid in countries 
with surplus labour as it is in others. But whereas in the latter it is a valid foundation of 
arguments for free trade, in the former it is an equally valid foundation of arguments for 
protection.”  
 
This perspective on openness dovetailed with other perspectives such as export 
pessimism on the demand for products produced by developing countries. Many models 
of development at this time were built on this foundation. Overall, it would be fair to say 
that Lewis was indeed suspicious of openness in trade and investment raising wages 
relative to the return to capital in a country with surplus labor. In addition, in his other 
writings he was quite “Kuznetsian” in seeing the initial stages of development as leading 
to rising inequality because, as he said (Lewis, 1976),  
 
“Development must be in egalitarian because it does not start in every part of the 
economy at the same time.... There may be one such enclave in an economy, or several; 
but at the start development enclaves include only a small minority of the population.” (p. 
26). 
 
Thus as opportunities opened up for trade they would be taken by some and not 
others and this would create inequality. At the same time, surplus labor would prevent the 
narrowing of the inequality on average between labor and capital. Overall, then, a 
pessimistic view on globalization and inequality. 
 
 Set counter to this perspective is a view of the world without surplus labor, with 
trade between economies with different degrees of labor scarcity. This neoclassical 
Hecksher-Ohlin model famously leads to the “Stolper-Samuelson” conclusion that 
opening up of trade will raise the relative return of the relatively abundant factor. Since in 
developing countries this factor is labor relative to capital, it must follow that opening up 
will narrow the differential in rates of return to labor and capital. Making the reasonable 
assumption that owners of capital are richer than those who earn their living through their 
labor power, it follows that globalization will reduce inequality in developing countries. 
 
 These theoretical perspectives corresponded of course to policy stances. Most 
developing countries in the immediate post-war period adopted import substitution 
strategies, convinced that opening up would be bad for growth and for inequality. 
Elaborate multisector planning models like those for the first Indian five year plans had 
these key elements of a focus on domestic markets and domestic industrialization. Latin 
American countries adopted import substitution strategies, as did the newly independent 
African countries in the 1960s and 1970s. However, a group of countries in East Asia 
went against this trend and, from the 1960s onwards, pursued policies of integration with 
the global economy. There is of course a huge debate on the details of these strategies. In 
particular, there is debate on the extent to which their policies can be classified as “free 
market” policies. But there is no question that for three decades after the war these 
economies, in contrast to other economies discussed above, did indeed integrate into the 
world economy in purposive manner. 
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The East Asia experience was crucial to the policy debates of the 1970s and 
1980s, and to the turn in policies that one began to see in the rest of the developing word 
from the 1980s and 1990s onwards. The 1960s and 1970s saw what has been dubbed the 
“East Asia miracle” of growth with equity. Not only did this group of countries have 
historically high growth rates, and higher growth rates than their contemporaries, they 
managed to do this with falling levels of inequality. The combination of high growth and 
falling inequality meant a sterling record in poverty reduction as well. 
 
The facts of the East Asia experience, growth with equity, are not in doubt. But 
their interpretation is a different story. I have already alluded to the use of the experience 
to support both the “free market” and the “judicial intervention” strands of the policy 
debate. The distributional outcomes have similarly been interpreted in different ways. 
One straightforward interpretation is in terms of support for the neo-classical Hecksher-
Ohlin model with its prediction that opening up would narrow the returns to labor and 
capital, and with it bring about a reduction in inequality. Indeed, this was the 
interpretation that was most used by those urging other countries, like India, to adopt 
outward oriented policies. Thus the classic exposition by Bhagwati and Desai (1970) 
represents a turning away from the nostrums of the immediate post-war, post-
Independence consensus in India that equitable development could only be achieved 
through import substitution and industrial planning. This strand of literature found its 
apogee in a series of studies in the World Bank in the 1980s, for example in 
Papagerogiou, Choksi and Michaely (1990), the capstone to publications entitled the 
“Liberalizing Foreign Trade Series.” The contrast of East Asia with stagnation in India 
and growth with inequality in Brazil was very much highlighted in this literature. At the 
same time, the integration of Europe through the European Union, and the success it 
delivered over a long period of high growth with moderate inequality, was also relevant 
in the policy discourse. 
 
However, the East Asian experience has also been used to support the thesis that 
the equity dimensions of outcomes owe a significant amount to other structural and 
policy features. Among these are the land reforms instituted by the occupying American 
forces in South Korea in the 1940s and 1950s, which meant that they entered the next 
phase of development, in the 1960s and 1970s, with supportive initial conditions for 
equitable development. Further, in these countries and in other East Asian countries, pro-
active policy had ensured a very wide spread of basic education. Here is how Irma 
Adelman, the leading scholar of South Korean development strategy at that time, sets out 
these structural factors in the country from the end of the Second World War till the 
beginning of the 1960s: 
 
“There were two waves of land reform, in 1947 and 1949. In 1947, the U.S. 
military government decreed that the land confiscated from Japanese farmers and 
Japanese corporations should be redistributed to tenants….The second wave of land 
reform redistributed the holdings of Korean landlords owning more than 3 chongbo (7.5 
acres or about 3 hectares) to tenant farmers and landless farm laborers….The distribution 
of land holdings became very even…. The bulk of government investment during this 
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period was on social development…Over this period, the literacy rate increased from 30 
to over 80 percent.” 
 
These structural factors have to be seen in conjunction with the perspective of 
Lewis (1976) that initial differences in advantage can be magnified by the appearance of 
economic opportunity. Thus perhaps the best interpretation of the East Asia experience is 
as being supportive of both a structuralist view and a neo-classical perspective based on 
Hecksher-Ohlin model. The land reforms and the wide spread of education 
simultaneously reduced surplus labor while at the same time making the distribution of 
assets (land and human capital) much more equal. The stage was thus set for an opening 
up and integration into the global economy to deliver growth with equity. But the 
outcome was dependent on the initial conditions at the time of the opening up, conditions 
which need not necessarily hold in other countries, or at other time periods. 
 
 
3.  Experience and New Theory from the 1980s Onwards 
 
 The policy debates of the three decades after the Second World War influenced 
and were influenced by the analytical frameworks developed to understand the impact of 
trade and investment openness on inequality. The experiences of this period, in particular 
the perceived “growth with equity miracle” of East Asian economies, contrasted with the 
stagnant or rising inequality in countries such as India (with relatively low growth) or 
Brazil (with relatively high growth) were particularly important in convincing policy 
makers to open up their economies from the 1980s onwards. However, the importance of 
structural features such as the low degree of asset inequality in East Asian economies 
when they launched their drive to openness seems not to have received as much attention. 
The past three decades have been periods of ever intensifying globalization as measured 
by trade integration and magnitude of capital flows. What has been the experience with 
inequality? 
 
The experience of the United States (and other developed economies) is 
interesting because of the possible light it can shed on the predictions of the standard 
Hecksher-Ohlin model. The simple model has the powerful prediction that opening up 
will narrow the returns between labor and capital in countries with a relatively low capital 
to labor ratio, or between skilled and unskilled labor in countries with a relatively low 
skilled to unskilled labor ratio. The observance of these trends in East Asia was read as 
support for the model. The flip side of this same prediction is that the gap between these 
returns should widen in countries with relatively high ratios of capital to labor and of 
skilled labor to unskilled labor. This did not happen in the US in the 1960s and 1970s, but 
has been happening since the 1980s. Now, it can be argued that given the relative size of 
the US economy it was only in the 1980s and 1990s, with the opening up of China and 
India, that the trade effects could be felt strongly enough to have an effect on factor 
returns. So the inequality trends in the US could indeed be claimed as partial support for 
the Hecksher-Ohlin model. 
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There is, however, the issue of how much of the rising inequality in the US can be 
attributed to trade, and how much to other factors, specifically, to technology. A recent 
overview by Pavcnik (2011) captures the recent consensus: 
 
“A large body of research on this topic finds little support that international trade 
in final goods driven by relative factor endowment differences can account for much of 
the observed increase in skill premiums in developed and developing countries…. First, 
the Stolper–Samuelson mechanism suggests that increased relative demand for skilled 
labour in countries abundant in skilled labour occurs as a result of shifts in the relative 
demand for skilled labour across industries….However, the employment shifts across 
industries have not been sufficiently large to account for the large increase in wage 
inequality. Most of the observed increase in demand for educated labour in countries such 
as the United States is driven by increased relative demand for skilled labour within 
industries.” (p.242) 
 
But there is significant debate on the relative role of trade. Thus although 
Krugman (2008) argues against his own earlier view that trade was a relatively small 
factor in explaining the rise of inequality compared to technology, there are also 
criticisms of the “small role of trade” view for example by Irwin (2008), Katz (2008), 
Autor (2010). It would be fair to say that skill-biased technical change is considered to be 
a major driving force, if not necessarily the dominant force, behind rising inequality. This 
empirical and policy debate has in turn fed into an emerging literature which goes beyond 
simple Hecksher-Ohlin/Stolper-Samuelson formulations to consider within industry wage 
differentials between heterogeneous firms and how these could be affected by trade.  
 
 The Hecksher-Ohlin predictions on trade and inequality could be argued to have 
been confirmed by the experience of rising trade and falling inequality in East Asia in the 
1960s and 1970s. They could equally well be argued to have been confirmed by the 
experience of the rising trade and rising inequality in the US from the 1990s onwards, 
although there is consensus that the forces of technology provide stronger explanation. 
However, the difficulty for the Hecksher-Ohlin model is that, contrary to its prediction, 
and contrary to the experience of East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s from the 1980s 
onwards, the experience of Asian economies and that of Latin America till the 2000s has 
been one of rising trade and rising inequality. As the comprehensive review by Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2007) concludes: 
 
 “The survey of the evidence confirms Wood (1999), who noted that inequality 
increased in several middle-income Latin American countries that liberalized their trade 
regimes in the 1980s and 1990s. It further suggests that this positive relationship holds in 
the cases of India, China and Hong Kong. As noted previously by Wood (1999), the 
experience of developing countries that globalized during the 1980s and 1990s contrast 
with the experiences of several Southeast Asian countries (South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore) that underwent trade reforms in the 1960s and 1970s. The latter underwent a 
decline in inequality as they opened up their economies to foreign markets.” 
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A number of comments are in order before we proceed to discuss the implications 
of these facts for the Hecksher Ohlin model. First, although the economies of Latin 
America liberalized during the 1980s and 1990s, this was also a period of painful 
macroeconomic adjustments and slow downs, and this could confound attribution of the 
causes of inequality. Second, note that the simple Lewis-Kuznets model discussed in the 
last section could indeed still predict an increase in inequality with opening up. Finally, 
however, two major further stylized facts have been established since the Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2007) survey. First, inequality has also increased in East Asia in the 1990s and 
the 2000s.3 Second, inequality has declined in Latin America since the 2000s.4 Both of 
these are after their major periods of trade liberalization and, particularly in Latin 
America, have been linked to redistributive policy—these policy issues will be taken up 
in a subsequent section. 
 
 The basic Hecksher-Ohlin/Stolper-Samuelson framework is foundational in the 
discourse on trade and inequality. But questions about its validity have been raised by the 
finding that inequality in many developing countries has increased since the 1980s 
despite increases in trade. This disconnect between prediction and outcome has led to a 
fruitful search for alternative explanations of why an increase in trade may increase 
inequality, and some of the theories advanced have also been helpful in understanding the 
impact of trade on inequality in developed countries as well. In this section we will 
examine a range of such theories as illustration of the direction the literature is taking in 
light of the experiences of the last three decades. 
 
 In the wake of the failure of the basic 2 goods, 2 factors HO model to predict co-
movement of trade and inequality, a range of models were developed which vary the 
technology or number of factors and goods, in order to derive predictions more consistent 
with the data. Thus, for example, Wood (1994) moves from the two factor model with a 
skilled/unskilled labor division to consider a three factor model with workers classified as 
skilled (high education)/semi-skilled (basic education)/unskilled (no education). Further 
there are three types of production—skill-intensive manufacturing, semi-skilled intensive 
manufacturing, and agriculture. In this setting, for a country with comparative advantage 
in agriculture we get the standard prediction that opening up will reduce inequality. 
However, for countries with a relatively large number of semi-skilled workers opening up 
will increase their wage relative to the wages of both high skill and unskilled workers. 
The effect on inequality is thus ambiguous, and measured inequality could increase. 
While an interesting extension to the basic HO model, it is not clear how well this fits the 
data. After all, East Asia in the 1960s could be argued to be a region with predominance 
of basic education, and evidence from the 1980s onwards suggests that wages of highly 
skilled have risen disproportionately. 
 
 In the same spirit, Davis (1996) considers a two factor (he calls them capital and 
labor), three good HO model, with market imperfections that prevent factor price 
equalization and full diversification of production. The three goods differ in the capital 
intensity of production technology. With countries ranked by capital intensity of factor 
                                                 
3 Kanbur and Zhuang (2012) 
4 Lustig et. al. (2011) 
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endowment, the least developed countries will export the least capital intensive 
commodity and import the next most capital intensive.  For these countries, the standard 
result will hold—opening up will narrow the gap in factor returns.  But for countries with 
intermediate levels of capital intensity of factor endowment, which will export the 
commodity with intermediate capital intensity of production and import the commodity 
with highest capital intensity of production, opening up will have the opposite effect.  Of 
course for the most developed countries we again have the standard Stolper-Samuelson 
result.  At least for developing economies at intermediate levels of capital intensity, then, 
this type of theorizing might explain co-movement of trade and inequality.  Such 
countries might, in principle, include East Asia from the 1980s onwards, and Latin 
America at the time of its opening up in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
 The papers by Wood (1994) and Davis (1996) are examples of attempts to predict 
co-movements of trade and inequality within a recognizably HO framework but with 
more disaggregated specification of commodities or factors.  This trend has continued in 
the literature, with added complications such as capital-skill complementarity in 
production—to the point that the discourse of today cannot really be labeled as a HO 
discourse.  In what follows I will consider this literature which highlights heterogeneity 
of workers, firms, and production processes. 
 
 Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) brings together several strands of the 
modern trade literature with a focus on firm and worker heterogeneity, and derives 
predictions on trade and inequality which are consistent with many of the empirical 
findings of the last thirty years.  Following Melitz (2003), the model supposes 
heterogeneous firms producing differentiated commodities.  Firms can enter by paying a 
fixed cost, but discover their productivity only after paying the sunk cost.  The 
productivities are drawn from a Pareto distribution, an assumption which helps in 
tractability of the model.  After productivity is revealed, firms decide whether and how 
much to produce for export or the domestic market, or both, or exit altogether.  
Production involves a fixed cost, and output is a function of firm productivity, number of 
workers hired, and their average ability.  A specific functional form is used for 
tractability, but the key aspect is that these three elements are complementary to each 
other.  
 
Worker ability is also assumed to have a Pareto distribution, again for tractability. 
Search and matching frictions exist in the model, and firms can pay more to match with 
more workers.  Further, among the workers the firm looks at, it can screen for higher 
abilities above a cutoff by paying a cost (with a higher cutoff costing more), but it cannot 
distinguish abilities beyond this cutoff.  Thus all workers in a firm are paid the same 
wage.  The wage is modeled as emerging from the outcome of a bargaining game 
between the firm and the average worker. 
 
Fixed costs of production, and fixed costs of exporting, mean that firms with very 
low productivities do not produce at all, while firms with high productivities select into 
exporting.  Given costs of search and screening, it can also be shown that firms with 
higher productivity and revenue search more and use a higher ability cutoff, so that they 
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have higher ability workers on average and thus higher wages.  The key point is that 
exporting firms pay higher wages in equilibrium.  Thus if we start from autarky, where 
fixed costs of exporting are so high that nobody exports, and reduce these fixed costs in 
comparative static manner so that some firms begin to export, wage inequality is 
introduced where none existed before.  This applies to all countries; thus opening up can 
increase inequality all countries, developed and developing, because of the selection 
effects of exporting. 
 
Verhoogen (2008) is another example of a similar model where selection effects 
can explain co-movement of trade and inequality.  The idea here is that exporting 
requires the production of higher quality products and only the most productive will find 
it profitable to go into exporting.  With a mechanism of higher wages in more productive 
firms, this in turn leads to greater inequality with more openness.  It should be noted that 
the Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2011) model also has an intriguing result at the other 
end of the spectrum where exporting costs are so low that all firms export.  Then, once 
again, wages are equal.  Thus, their model, inequality first increase and then decreases as 
opening up intensifies—Kuznets type “inverted-U” relationship between inequality and 
openness.  It is of course an empirical question as to whether the intensified globalization 
from the 1980s onwards has now taken some countries to the point where the model 
would predict falling inequality.  If this was the case for some countries, then of course 
the model could not explain the co- movement of trade and inequality for those countries, 
and other explanations would have to be considered. 
 
A selection mechanism of a different sort is present in studies of outsourcing as 
exemplified by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997), which also relates to a broader 
literature in outsourcing and FDI in trade.  They consider a set up where the final output 
is produced using intermediate inputs which are in turn produced using different 
intensities of skilled and unskilled labor.  Consider now two economies with different 
endowments of skilled and unskilled labor.  For any given pattern of trade costs, the 
skilled labor abundant (developed) economy will use the more skilled intensive 
production of intermediate inputs.  When trade costs are lowered in a comparative statics 
exercise, some of this production is relocated from the developed economy to the 
developing economy.  But the activity that is relocated is the least skilled intensive in the 
developed economy and the most skill intensive in the developing economy.  This 
increases skill intensity of production in both the developing and the developed economy 
and hence widens the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor in both economies. 
Feenstra and Hansen (1997) show empirical support for this as explaining rising wage 
inequality in Mexico. 
 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) highlight an aspect of globalization which has come 
to the fore in the last thirty years, namely, foreign direct investment (FDI).  The issue of 
portfolio and financial flows will be taken up in a subsequent section, but longer term 
FDI has also been important in the recent growth surges in developing countries.  What 
are the implications of FDI for inequality? 
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The theory of FDI in the simple Lewis model discussed in the previous section 
suggests that as wages rise in a formerly surplus labor economy, capitalists will look to 
investment opportunities abroad, presumably in economies where wages are lower still.  
If these economies are themselves in a state of surplus labor then further investment will 
raise the share of capital and worsen the distribution of income for that reason.  However, 
if the “Lewis turning point” has already been reached in the economy receiving FDI, this 
investment will raise wages further in that economy and this could be a channel for 
reducing inequality. 
 
Modern theories of the impact of FDI build on the Hecksher-Ohlin framework 
and then bring in firm and worker heterogeneity, as in the analysis of Feenstra and 
Hanson (1997).  Overall, it would be fair to say that the theoretical conclusions are 
ambiguous, with some suggestion of FDI contributing to an increase in inequality in 
developing countries at the start of the process, with a possible turnaround in the later 
stages.  For example, Aghion and Howitt (1998) discuss the transition as domestic firms 
absorb the new technology of the FDI. Inequalities may be created in the early stages, but 
is mitigated in later stages as the transition proceeds—a Kuznets type inverted-U 
relationship which has framed much of the empirical work in this area.  The large and 
growing empirical literature also gives mixed results, with perhaps a greater weight to the 
conclusion that FDI is associated with rising inequality in earlier stages5, but that there 
may be a turn around, and that the impact is muted or even negative at higher levels of 
income per capita.6 
 
Selection effects as the result of global integration are now central to the trade and 
FDI literature, and thus to the attempts to explain co-movement of trade and inequality. 
They do appear to provide a coherent explanation of increases in inequality in both 
developed and developing countries, and for this reason merit close theoretical and 
empirical attention in the years to come.7 
 
 
4.  Economic Crisis and Income Distribution 
  
It is often said that globalization brings risks as well as opportunities at the 
macroeconomic level.  Greater integration with the global economy can lead to the 
                                                 
5 Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for Mexico, Figini and Gorg (1999) for Ireland, Taylor and Driffield (2005) 
for the United Kingdom, Tsai (1995) for a cross section of 33 countries and Basu and Guarglia (2007) for 
80 countries, find the increasing relationship.  
6 Figini and Gorg (2011) find, for a cross section of 100 developing and developed countries, that: “Results 
for developing countries are robust and suggest the presence of a nonlinear effect: wage inequality 
increases with FDI inward stock, but this effect diminishes with further increases in FDI. For developed 
countries, wage inequality decreases with FDI inward stock, and there is no robust evidence to show that 
this effect is nonlinear.” 
7  The literature on heterogeneous workers, heterogeneous firms and trade is exploding, and it would be 
impossible to do it justice in the space available. The recent survey by Grossman (2013) is useful, as is 
Costinot (2009). The paper by Costinot essentially generalizes HO to trade models with heterogeneous 
workers and firms.  
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economy being buffeted by global fluctuations in trade and capital flows.  What has been 
the contribution of openness to macroeconomic volatility?  The current consensus and 
weight of research seems to suggest that openness is associated with greater volatility 
(Rodrik, 1998; Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2001; Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2006; 
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2006).  The paper by di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008) 
conducts a careful analysis of the channels through which trade openness increases 
volatility.  They test for three channels: (i) increased volatility of individual sectors, (ii) 
increased co-movement of sectors, and (iii) a more specialized production pattern.  They 
find support for the first and third but find that more openness in a sector reduces the co-
movement of its growth with overall growth in the economy, which tends to reduce 
aggregate volatility.  However, the overall effect of openness on volatility is clear: 
“…moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in trade openness is associated with an 
increase in aggregate volatility of about 17.3% of the average aggregate variance 
observed in the data.  The impact of openness on volatility varies a great deal depending 
on country characteristics, however.  For instance, we estimate that an identical change in 
trade openness is accompanied by an increase in aggregate volatility that is five times 
higher in the average developing country compared to the average developed country. 
Lastly, we estimate how the impact of trade changes across decades.  It turns out that all 
three channels, as well as the overall effect, increase in importance over time:  the impact 
of the same trade opening on aggregate volatility in the 1990s is double what it was in the 
1970s.” (p. 5) 
 
 However, a major focus of the last two decades has been volatility and crises 
induced by financial flows.  Financial crises appear to be the new normal in the global 
economy. Fully fledged global crises, like the one which started in 2008-9, or the East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 which also had global repercussions, are recognized to have 
been at least aided by the far greater ease of movement of portfolio capital around the 
world, in the wake of capital account liberalizations from the 1990s onwards.  These 
global crises also have implications for national level macroeconomic volatility, which 
has also been affected by trade openness.  Indeed, Hnatovska and Loayza (2013) argue 
that the increased can be attributed more to crises (“large recessions”) than to the normal 
economic cycle. 
 
 There is now a consensus that volatility is associated with lower growth—
Hntavoska and Loayza (2013) is only the most recent assessment in this vein.  However, 
this section will review the recent discourse on the consequences of economic crisis for 
the distribution of income—for poverty and for inequality8.  The literature has set out a 
range of channels through which a global collapse of the type seen in 2008-9, or the more 
limited contagion effects of the crisis in 1997 feed through into income distribution. 
Atkinson and Morelli (2011) and Baldachi, de Mello and Inchauste (2002) between them 
highlight the following channels: 
 
1. Economic slowdown.  As a “balance sheet adjustment” recession takes hold in 
originating countries, they are transmitted through trade to other countries. 
                                                 
8 There is a growing literature on whether inequality in turn breeds crises—a good example of this line of 
argument is in Rajan (2011). We will not discuss this strand of the literature here. 
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Thus each country faces an economic slowdown.  There is unemployment in 
the formal sector and consequent downward pressure on earnings in the 
informal sector.  We would expect the impact of economic slowdown to be 
rising poverty and also rising inequality. 
2. Relative prices and sectoral effects.  For a particular country, the decline in 
international demand may be concentrated in specific sectors, with quantity 
and price effects.  Thus unemployment and wage contraction will have 
sectoral patterns which differ from country to country.  Here the impact on 
wage inequality will depend on whether the sectors that are negatively 
impacted were the ones that were paying higher wages to begin with.  If so, 
then crisis could actually reduce inequality through this channel (although 
poverty would rise). 
3. Asset effects.  Changes in interest rates, and revaluation of assets, can affect 
incomes and wealth at the top of the income distribution. If there are major 
downward valuations and reductions in income from capital, then crises could 
reduce wealth and income inequality through this channel. 
4. Policy responses.  This includes the consequences of fiscal retrenchment, 
which will have impacts at the lower tail of the income distribution, or bank 
bail outs, which will affect the top end of the distribution.  In general, fiscal 
retrenchment through reducing public employment, or support for public 
works schemes and other forms of unemployment support, would increase 
poverty and inequality in the social sectors.  Bank bailouts would support 
asset values and incomes at the top end of the income distribution, and so 
increase inequality.  Finally, an important channel linking crises and 
distribution is the drastic devaluation most often undertaken as a response to a 
balance of payment crisis.  This is equivalent to a drop in real wages and an 
increase in profits.  
 
Each of these channels can have multiple types of impact on poverty and 
inequality, so the overall effect is an empirical question. Ravallion and Chen (2009) focus 
on the 2008 global financial crisis and provide projections of the likely impact on 
poverty.  They estimate that “the crisis will add 64 million people to the population living 
under a dollar a day.”  The methodology for doing this, however, assumes no 
distributional change within a country, based on the observed regularity that “relative 
inequality falls about as often as it rises during aggregate economic contractions, with 
zero change on average.”  Thus Chen and Ravallion (2009) simply apply projected 
contraction in total consumption and assume this contraction to be distributionally 
neutral.  They do recognize, however, that “While distribution neutrality is plausible on 
average, there will be some countries where the poverty impact of the crisis is greater 
than these calculations suggest, and some where it will be smaller.  Country-specific 
analysis would be needed to determine which countries might have above-average 
impacts.” 
 
An attempt at identifying poverty and inequality impacts through cross country 
regression techniques is presented by Baldachi, de Mello and Inchauste (2002).  They 
define crisis episodes, identify appropriate controls of country-time spells, and estimate 
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the impact of crisis on different dimensions of income distribution.  Not surprisingly, 
they find that crises are associated with rising poverty.  However, in terms of income 
distribution they find that “The main losers in terms changes in income shares are not the 
poorest (lowest income quintile) but those in the second (lowest)income quintile, The 
income share of the highest quintile also falls in crisis years relative to pre-crisis years.” 
Thus, treating this regression finding as being a representation of the average outcome, 
the results are consistent with the assumption of Chen and Ravallion that crises are on 
average distribution neutral. 
 
The post 1997 crisis experience highlights the country specific differences that 
can arise.  Hagen (2007) argues that income inequality rose significantly in Korea after 
the crisis.  Similarly, inequality rose in Singapore and Malaysia, but it fell in Indonesia 
and in Mauritius (Atkinson and Morelli, 2011).  Atkinson and Morelli (2011) assess the 
association between crises and inequality for a large number of crises over a long period. 
They distinguish between banking crises and crises of collapse in consumption.  They 
look at the time path of inequality on either side of the identified crisis.  For the former 
they conclude that “The empirical evidence suggests that cases in which inequality tend 
to increase following the crisis are in majority, although we should caution that the 
sample size is too limited to draw firm conclusions.”  For the latter, “empirical evidence 
concerning “change in direction” suggests that consumption crises are more associated 
with reduction in inequality.  No particular pattern stands out from the analysis of GDP 
crises.” 
 
 It would seem, therefore, that no easy generalizations are available for the impact 
of crises on inequality, as might be expected from the multiple channels through which 
they can work, and how initial conditions in a country can affect the impact.  What this 
means is that we need country specific modeling to analyze, and to predict the impact of 
crisis on inequality.  On such approach is that of a micro simulation model, as in the work 
of Habib, Narayan, Oliveri and Sanchez-Paramo (2010).  The approach combines 
macroeconomic projections with transmission mechanisms to the income distribution:  
 
“The model focuses on labor markets and migration as transmission mechanisms 
and allows for two types of shocks:  shocks to labor income, modeled as employment 
shocks, earnings shocks or a combination of both; and shocks to non-labor income, 
modeled as a shock to remittances.  Shocks can be positive or negative depending on the 
trends outlined by the macroeconomic projections.  In most cases labor income and 
remittances account for at least 75-80% of household income.” 
 
Such country specific analysis can then be used both to identify early warning 
indicators, and to design possible policy responses.  For example, the authors apply the 
model to Bangladesh and recommend monitoring of remittances and wages by sector as 
indicators of the need for action.9  A range of these models and methods is surveyed in 
Bourguignon and Bussolo (2012), and in Burguignon, Silva and Bussolo (2008). 
However, an important question arises on whether we use anonymous distributions 
                                                 
9 For an example of a microsimulation model to the impact of crisis on inequality for a developed country, 
see O’Donoghue, Loughrey and Morrissey (2013). 
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before and after crises or whether we use panel data which follow individuals from before 
the crisis to after.  Then anonymous distributions can show no change even when there is 
considerable “churning” as a result of the crisis, as pointed out by Robilliard, Burguignon 
and Robinson (2008). 
 
 
5.  Globalization and Gender Inequality 
 
 Up to now we have analyzed the relationship between globalization and 
interpersonal inequality without regard to the gender of the persons. Indeed, gender was 
not present at all in the classical developments in attempts to link trade theory to theory 
of income distribution.  However, in the past quarter century this issue has come to the 
fore strongly in the policy and the analytical literature.  The analytical reasons for this 
development are related to greater evidence on gender dimensions of inequality, and the 
development of non-unitary models of the household which allow for the prospect of 
unequal outcomes within the household.  The policy reasons are related to strong debates 
on whether global integration of the past quarter century has hurt or helped women. 
 
It is now well established that there is a strong gender dimension to interpersonal 
inequality.10  This is most easily demonstrated empirically for variables which can be 
quantified at the individual level.  Patterns are country specific, of course, but in many 
developing countries educational attainments are lower for women than for men, and 
especially so at lower incomes.  Sex ratios at birth in some countries reveal 
discrimination against women in sex selection, and maternal mortality rates in many 
developing countries are at the levels that Sweden attained in 1900.  Women earn less 
than men for similar work, but also work in sectors and occupations that are low 
paying.11  
 
It is not easy to measure the magnitude of gender inequality along the standard 
dimension of consumption, since consumption data are usually collected at the household 
level in surveys.  The first cut of measuring gender inequality by inequality between 
female headed households and male headed households is unsatisfactory for obvious 
reasons.  But the standard assumption in translating household level information into 
individual level wellbeing is to simply divide by household size and to allocate per capita 
consumption of the household to each individual in the household.  Of course, this 
suppresses all intra-household inequality including gender inequality.  Thus our standard 
measures of inequality are underestimates of true inequality since they set gender 
inequality in consumption within the household to zero.  On rare occasions when 
individual level consumption data is available (for example on food consumption), it has 
been shown that the standard procedure understates inequality (and poverty) by as high as 
25% (Haddad and Kanbur, 1990).  Thus gender inequality, as reflected in intra household 
inequality, matters. 
 
                                                 
10 Chapter 13 of this volume is devoted to the topic of Gender Inequality. 
11 World Bank (2011), pp. 74, 78 and 79. 
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While it is accepted that gender structures inequality in an economy, there is less 
consensus on how exactly globalization interacts with this structure.  How is the standard 
analysis of openness and inequality, for example, affected by structuring the economy 
along gender lines?  And, overall, does globalization reduce gender inequality, or 
increase it? 
 
Before looking at some evidence, let us consider how standard theoretical 
arguments on globalization and inequality could be modified by taking into account the 
gender dimension of production and income distribution.  A standard piece of analysis in 
open economy macroeconomics is the effect of devaluation on the balance of payments. 
As is well known, the transmission mechanism is through “expenditure switching” 
brought about by raising the price of tradables relative to the price of non-tradables.  The 
distributional consequences of this have been analyzed in the usual way through the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem.  If tradables are relatively more intensive in their use of 
labor then the relative return to labor will rise.  Indeed, this was the argument made by 
many for the pro-poor and progressive aspects of devaluation.  
 
But suppose now that tradables are actually more intensive in their use of male 
labor. Then it is seen that male earnings will be favored.  This should not matter much if 
there was perfect income sharing within the household—the representative household 
would gain overall if the policy of devaluation was efficient for the economy as a whole. 
But if the household is not described by a unitary model, if for example there is 
bargaining between the man and the woman and their outside options matter for the 
outcome of bargaining, then the macro policy of devaluation will have the micro 
consequence of strengthening the bargaining power of males and will have a type of 
impact on inequality not at contemplated in the classical analysis.12  Of course, the 
outcome is context specific—it depends on which sector is male or female labor 
intensive.  The main theoretical point, however, is that gender matters (Haddad and 
Kanbur, 1994). 
 
The above is in terms of the pure demand for labor.  However, there is also 
evidence that women are paid less for the same job.  The impact of globalization on such 
wage differentials is uncertain.  On the one hand, there is the standard argument that 
greater global competition will reduce the scope for discriminatory wage practices and 
this should narrow wage differentials.  However, to the extent that mobility of capital 
reduces bargaining power of workers, and to the extent that women are concentrated in 
industries where capital is more mobile, greater openness will lead to lower female wages 
(Seguino, 2007).  The effects of this competition in footloose industries might be seen not 
just in standard wages but in labor standards as well (Chau and Kanbur, 2003, 2006). 
Again, to the extent that women are disproportionately employed in such industries, the 
impact of globalization will impact upon them disproportionately.  
 
                                                 
12 Again, there is considerable evidence that household decision making is not best described by the unitary 
model. For an early survey of the literature see Alderman et. al. (1995). An up to date review is provided in 
Chapter 17 of this Volume. 
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There are two main empirical strands of the gender and globalization literature. 
The first is focused on the effects of openness on demand for female labor and on female 
wages.  The second is related to the previous section—how crises affect women relative 
to men. We take up these strands one at a time. 
 
The effects of opening up on the demand for female labor are nuanced and 
context specific.  On the one hand the demand for female labor rises through expansion 
of light manufactures.  As the World Bank’s World Development Report on Gender 
notes: 
 
“In the Republic of Korea, the share of women employed in manufacturing grew 
from 6 percent in 1970 to around 30 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s…..Similarly, in 
Mexico female employment in manufacturing grew from 12 percent in 1960 to 17 
percent in 2008, with 10 times more women in 2008 than in 1960.” (World Bank, 2011, 
p. 256). 
 
However, this phase contrasts with the next phase as there is a move to the 
production of more capital intensive goods (Seguino, 2012; van Staveren et. al. 2007; 
Tejani and Milberg, 2010).  What about female-wage differentials? Here again the 
evidence reflects the conflicting forces, which are resolved differently in different 
countries.  As Seguino (2012) notes in her overview: 
 
“Evidence of the impact of trade and investment liberalization for gender wage 
equality is also mixed. Some studies show that gender wage differentials have declined, 
in large part due to narrowing educational gaps.  But in several developing countries, 
including China and Vietnam, however, the discriminatory portion of gender wage gaps 
has increased.” 
 
A final, newly emergent strand of the literature provides a gender perspective on 
the selection and heterogeneity models discussed in Section 3.  The argument put forward 
by Juhn, Ujhelyi and Villegas-Sanchez (2013) builds on the idea that more productive 
firms enter into export and modernize technologies. If new technologies require less 
physical strength (the “brains” versus “brawn” issue, as it is characterized in some 
circles), we would expect that demand for female labor would rise in blue-collar 
occupations and not in white collar occupations.  This is because new technology can 
change the “brain/brawn” mix in blue collar occupations, but white collar jobs will be 
unaffected on this score.  The authors find that for Mexico, post NAFTA tariff reductions 
are associated with rising female employment and wage shares in blue-collar jobs but not 
in white-collar jobs.13 
 
The various contradictory forces are also highlighted in Bussolo and de Hoyos 
(2009), on the basis of their studies of Africa and Latin America, and they conclude, 
essentially, that with forces pulling in opposite directions, the net effect of trade openness 
on gender inequality may well turn out to be fairly weak: 
 
                                                 
13 The brain-brawn issue is also discussed in World Bank (2012), p.259.  
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“Overall, the messages of this volume are very clear: trade expansion exacerbates 
gender disparities in agricultural-based, African economies and reduces it in 
manufacturing-based economies like Honduras….Admittedly, the magnitude of the links 
between trade shocks, producer prices, male versus female bargaining power, 
consumption decisions, future growth and poverty reduction does not seem too 
large.…..To conclude, trade liberalization brings important gender effects, but the 
evidence collected here shows that these effects tend to be of a small and sometimes 
uncertain magnitude.” 
 
While the literature on the trade effects of globalization on gender inequality thus 
renders a relatively neutral verdict, the same is not true of the literature on the impact of 
economic crises on women.  The effects of economic downturns generally, and economic 
collapses in particular, are argued to be felt most sharply by women, since they tend to be 
displaced first.  In turn, they crowd into the informal sector, pushing down earnings 
further in that sector, which is in any case disproportionately female in employment 
(Braunstein and Heintz, 2008; Takhtamanova and Sierminska, 2009).  It is further argued 
that the fiscal retrenchment which accompanies economic crises affects women 
disproportionately both directly and indirectly, through reducing public services which 
support women’s work, like health and child care (Seguino, 2012). 
 
There is, finally, an intriguing and important, but unresolved issue of the effects 
of globalization on societal norms which determine the structure of gender inequality. 
Based on the work of Kabeer (1997, 2000) and Hossain (2011), World Bank (2011) 
argues as follows: 
 
“In Bangladesh, the employment of hundreds of thousands of women in the 
ready-made garment industry feminized the urban public space, creating more gender-
equitable norms for women’s public mobility and access to public institutions. In the 
process,  Bangladeshi women had to redefine and negotiate the terms of purdah, typically 
reinterpreting it as a state of mind in contrast to its customary expression as physical 
absence from the public space, modest clothing, and quiet demeanor.” 
 
How widespread these effects are, and how much they can be attributed to 
globalization, is still under debate.  But what is clear is that any discussion of 
globalization and inequality must go beyond the classical analysis and develop theory and 
empirical investigation on the globalization and the gender dimension of inequality.  
 
 
6.  Openness and Spatial Inequality 
 
The spatial dimension of inequality is a key concern in the policy discourse, 
because it intersects with and interacts with disparities between sub-national entities and 
jurisdictions.  These entities sometimes have defined ethnic or linguistic characteristics, 
and in Federal structures have constitutional identities which naturally lead to a sub-
national perspective on national inequality.  This section considers the impact of 
globalization, in particular greater openness in trade, on spatial inequality. 
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What exactly is spatial inequality?  One way of linking standard interpersonal 
measurement of inequality to regional inequality is to decompose national inequality into 
a between-region and a within-region component.  The share of national inequality 
accounted for by the between-region component—which would be zero were it not for 
the fact that average incomes differ across regions—is then a measure of regional 
inequality. An alternative, however, is to consider the disparities in regional mean 
incomes directly, not weighted by their population.  Equal weights correspond to some 
dimensions of many constitutions, where key elements of political power are divided 
equally between constituent provinces or states (Kanbur and Venables, 2005).  In the case 
of just two entities, then, this could be simply the ratio of the two means, for example. 
For more than two entities, other standard measures of dispersion can be used.  Yet other 
measures are sometimes used in the literature, attempting to capture regional 
“polarization.”  But as Zhang and Kanbur (2001) argue, such measures may not make 
that much of difference in assessing trends. 
 
However spatial inequality is measured, there are major differences in the 
literature on how much it should matter in policy design.  One strand of the policy 
discourse can be characterized by the “balanced development” perspective, which holds 
that too much concentration of economic activity is inimical to equity and to efficiency. 
However, there is a contrary strand which is best expressed in the World Bank’s World 
Development Report on Economic Geography (World Bank, 2008, p. 73): 
 
 “For decades, “spatially balanced growth” has been a mantra of policy makers in 
many developing countries. It was an obsession of planners in the former Soviet 
Union…. And it has been the objective of governments of various political hues in the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Russian 
Federation, South Africa, and other great developing nations.  There has even been a 
strong commitment to spatially balanced development in the economic history of many 
developed countries.” 
 
This strong perspective against “balanced growth” in the conventional sense is 
important in light of the Report’s own assessment of evolving economic forces, in 
particular global integration in the era of globalization: 
 
“Although the basic forces shaping the internal economic geography of 
developing countries are the same as those that earlier shaped the economic landscapes of 
today’s developed countries, the magnitudes have changed. Larger international markets, 
better transportation, and improved communication technologies mean that leading areas 
in open developing countries have greater market potential than industrial countries did in 
their early development.  So the forces for spatial divergence between leading and 
lagging areas are now stronger.” (World Bank, 2008, p. 74). 
 
The above perspective on openness and economic spatial disparity owes much to 
the burgeoning “new economic geography” literature which brings increasing returns to 
scale and agglomeration economies center stage in characterizing the development of an 
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economy.  In the context of a closed economy with two sectors, one of which 
(“agriculture”) has conventional diminishing returns while the other (“manufacturing”) 
displays firm level costs that fall as the sector as a whole grows, equilibrium can have 
spatial concentration of economic activity even when there is no “natural” geographic 
differentiation between the regions.14  There is thus a distinction between spatial 
divergence caused by “first nature geography”, natural variations in environmental 
endowment, and “second nature geography” which arises out of the self-enforcing 
feedback loops of agglomeration economies.15 
 
What precisely is the impact of greater openness on spatial disparity when played 
through the forces of agglomeration economies?  The World Bank (2008) quote above 
seems to suggest that spatial disparities will increase.  However, the specific theory does 
not produce quite such a clear cut answer.  Different specifications, modeling different 
contexts, produce different answers.16  For example, it matters whether different regions 
have equal access to the international market or not.  It also matters whether the opening 
up is only for trade or also for capital mobility.  The theoretical ambiguity is emphasized 
in recent papers by Rodriguez-Pose (2010) and Ottaviano (2009).  Ottaviano (2009) 
summarizes the theoretical conclusions in a series of propositions as follows: 
 
“when regions have the same access to foreign markets, international trade 
liberalization fosters regional disparities and this effect is stronger the more 
important the foreign market and the more integrated the national market.” (p. 7) 
“if the smaller region is a gate or a hub, international trade liberalization may 
reduce regional disparities.” (p. 8) 
“International capital mobility amplifies the positive effect of trade liberalization 
on regional disparities in the smaller country as well as in the larger one.” (p. 8). 
 
Given these theoretical ambiguities, then, what is the evidence on openness and 
spatial inequality? Kanbur and Venables (2007) summarize the results of a major project 
collating country case studies on the evolution of spatial inequality in the last quarter 
century.  For 26 developing and transition countries spatial inequality measures are 
available for at two or more points in time, so that we can get a sense of the time trends. 
The first and major empirical finding is that spatial inequalities have been rising in the 
last two to three decades.17  
 
The last three decades have also been the period of globalization. Is there then a 
link between openness on rising spatial inequality?  The case studies reported in Kanbur 
and Venables (2007) seem to support the hypothesis that openness and is associated with 
greater spatial inequality.  Thus Kanbur and Zhang (2005) establish dramatic increases in 
spatial inequality in China since the start of the reforms in 1978.  Their econometric 
                                                 
14 There is of course by now a huge literature on this. Standard references include Krugman (1991), Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables (2001), Ottaviano and Thisse (2004).  
15 Kanbur and Venables (2007). 
16 Compare, for example, Krugman and Livas-Elizondo, 1996, and Paluzie, 2001. 
17 Examples include Sahn and Stifle (2003) for a range of African countries, Garcia-Verdu (2005) for 
Mexico,  Forster, Jesuit and Smeeding (2005) for Eastern Europe, Friedman (2005) for Indonesia and 
Kanbur and Zhang (2005) for China. 
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analysis attributes at least part of this increase to the measure of openness (the other 
factors that are statistically significant include the degree of decentralization).  
Rodriguez-Pose and Sanchez-Reaza (2005) find greater regional polarization in Mexico 
comparing the periods before and after the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
Friedman (2005) identifies an indirect channel for Indonesia, in that openness leads to 
growth but more remote areas benefit less from growth in terms of poverty reduction 
impact. Outside of the country studies reviewed in Kanbur and Venables (2007), Daumal 
(2008) finds that while for India openness contributes to greater inequality between 
Indian states, for Brazil the opposite is true.  Thus country context matters. 
 
A number of cross-country regression studies have also focused on the issue of 
the link between openness and spatial inequality.  Barrios and Strobl (2009) regress 
within country regional inequality against trade openness, with other controls, for 15 
European Union countries.  They find a positive association between regional inequality 
and the trade to GDP ratio for a country.  Milanovic (2005) considers the evolution of 
regional inequality over time in China, India, US, Indonesia and Brazil over 1980-2000. 
He finds a significant causal relationship between measures of openness and measures of 
regional inequality.  Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2006) analyze regional inequality similarly 
across country panels for the period 1970-2000. They find that it is the particular 
interaction of openness with the composition of trade which translates into regional 
inequality impacts. 
 
 Perhaps the most comprehensive recent cross-country study of regional 
inequality and openness is by Rodriguez-Pose (2010).  It uses unbalanced panel data for 
28 countries over 1975-2005. Half of these countries are developed countries and the 
other half are developing or transition economies.  The measure of regional inequality 
used is the Gini coefficient of regional GDP per capita.  There is no simple association 
between openness and regional inequality in these data.  However, this is before various 
controls are introduced, and the panel structure of the data is exploited with appropriate 
techniques.  On the conditioning variables, use is made of the theory referred to earlier, 
so that “greater trade openness will have a more polarizing effect in countries 
characterized by a) higher differences in foreign market accessibility among its regions 
and b) where there is also a high degree of coincidence between the regional income 
distribution and accessibility to foreign markets.” (Rodriguez-Pose, 2010, p. 13).  
Further, like Kanbur and Zhang’s (2005) work on China, it is hypothesized that the 
degree of decentralization will also matter for regional inequality.  A number of other 
controls are also used, including institutional quality variables.  
 
The overall conclusion, of Rodriguez-Pose’s (2010) comprehensive and rigorous 
analysis, is striking: 
 
“By and large, countries in the developing world are characterized by a series of 
features that are likely to potentiate the spatially polarizing effects of greater openness to 
trade.  Their higher existing levels of regional inequality, their greater degree of sector 
polarization, the fact that their wealthier regions often coincide with the key entry points 
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to trade, and their weaker state all contribute to exacerbate regional disparities as trade 
with the external world increases.” (Rodriguez-Pose, 2010, p. 26). 
 
Thus structural differences in the country at the time of opening up tend to 
interact with the forces of openness, and in the recent experience at least, this has led to 
openness contributing to greater regional inequality.  Of course this leaves open the issue 
of whether this is not just the first round effects of trade opening, and whether it could it 
be weakened or offset by further geographical adjustments, e.g. domestic migration of 
workers or capital, at a later stage.  However, the inequality consequences in the short run 
will need to be addressed, and the policy implications of these findings will be taken up 
in a subsequent section. 
 
 
7.  International Migration, Remittances and Inequality 
 
Globalization in its most general terms is the greater integration of global 
economic activity.  This is manifested in larger trade and in freer movement of factors of 
production.  The vastly increased mobility of capital is often commented upon in the 
discourse.  However, larger cross-border movement of population, from low income to 
high income countries, is also the subject of commentary in the popular discourse. An 
analytical literature has also developed to assess this phenomenon and to explore its 
causes and consequences.  This section will provide an overview of this literature, 
focusing in particular on migration from developing to developed countries, and on the 
impact of this migration on inequality in developing countries. 
 
In 2010 the total number of international migrants in the world (developed and 
developing countries) was 214 million people, up from 191 million in 2005.18  This 
compares to an estimated number of 749 million for internal migrants. International 
migration is a significant and growing phenomenon.  This is especially true of migration 
from developing to developed countries.  The stock of immigrants in high income 
countries increased at about 3% per year from 1980 to 2000.  As a share of high income 
country population, migrants increased from around 4% to above 8% over this twenty 
year period. 19 
 
How might the much higher rate of international migration affect the distribution 
of income in developing countries in theory?  The answer depends of course on who 
migrates and what they do with their income after they migrate in terms of remittances to 
their family.  If migration and remittance was representative of the domestic income 
distribution, then the distribution would not be affected, except for a translation to the 
right as remittances flowed back.  Thus poverty would decline as a result of international 
migration.  
 
But what if migration was not representative but was selective on individual 
characteristics?  Would the poverty results still hold?  The impact effect of migration out 
                                                 
18 International Organization for Migration (2011), p.49. 
19 World Bank (2006), p. 27. 
 
 
27
as the result of better income earning opportunities must surely be to reduce poverty at 
the origin.  However, in the next round there is the possibility of externalities kicking in if 
the migrants are the most highly skilled, with knock on effects on the rest of the 
economy.  This is the famous “brain drain” hypothesis which was popular in the 1970s 
and 1980s.20  However, in recent years this has been countered by the “brain gain” 
hypothesis.  This is the simple idea that the probability of having access to international 
migration depends on the education level of the prospective migrant. In order to improve 
this probability prospective migrants invest in education.  Only some of these will be 
selected for migration, but those left behind will serve to increase the stock of human 
capital compared to what it would have been without the prospect of migration.21  
 
There is some empirical support for the brain gain hypothesis; although others 
argue that its magnitude is greatly exaggerated.22  But, furthermore, there is considerable 
evidence for the proposition that international migration reduces poverty in the origin 
country.  In perhaps the most comprehensive such exercise, Adams and Page (2005) 
asked the question on the impact of international migration on poverty using data from 71 
developing countries: 
 
“The results show that both international migration and remittances significantly 
reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in the developing world.  After 
instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international migration, and controlling for 
various factors, results suggest that, on average, a 10% increase in the share of 
international migrants in a country’s population will lead to a 2.1% decline in the share of 
people living on less than $1.00 per person per day.  After instrumenting for the possible 
endogeneity of international remittances, a similar 10% increase in per capita official 
international remittances will lead to a 3.5% decline in the share of people living in 
poverty.”  (Adams and Page, 2005, p. 1645).23 
 
These results are confirmed by a range of country specific studies on international 
migration, remittances and poverty—examples include Acosta, Fajnzylber, Lopez (2006) 
for Latin America, Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovski, and Glinskaya (2007) for Nepal and 
Adams (2006) for Ghana. 
 
So much for poverty, where theory and evidence is relatively clear cut.  But what 
about inequality?  It should be clear that selectivity of migration and remittances makes 
this an intricate question theoretically and empirically.  And the question of identifying 
                                                 
20 See for example Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). 
21 Mountford (1997), Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997) 
22 See Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008) for support; however, see Schiff for a skeptical perspective. 
23  It should be noted that there is an issue in interpreting these results which is similar to the problem of the 
counterfactual when micro-simulating the effects of remittances. In the regression: Poverty = f(GDP per 
capita, remittances per capita) the net effect of the latter variable should be the estimated coefficient minus 
the (negative) change in mean income or GDP per capita due to migration times the coefficient of the mean 
income variable. But for this, we need an estimate of the impact of migration on the home country mean 
income. If it is assumed to be zero then it is in effect assumed that migrants' labor supply is fully 
compensated by people remaining behind them.  
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such selectivity is an important one in the international migration literature. In particular, 
there is some debate about whether migrants are selected according to education level. 
Using data from Doquier and Marfouk (2006), Hanson (2010) compares the share of 
emigrants with tertiary education to the share of total population with tertiary education. 
He finds that in the vast majority of the countries, the former exceeds the latter, 
indicating positive selection into migration by higher levels of education. Mexico and 
Puerto Rico appear to be exceptions to this almost universal phenomenon, but research on 
migration from those origins to the United States seems to have had a big weight in the 
discourse.  Hanson (2010) argues that a larger literature now seems to support selection 
on education.  
 
What about migration selection based on unobserved variables?  McKenzie, 
Gibson and Stillman (2006) conduct an ingenious exercise using the results of a lottery 
for emigration from Tonga to New Zealand.  McKenzie et. al. (2006) compares losers in 
the lottery with non-applicants, both groups of course still being in Tonga.  They find that 
the applicants have higher earnings after controlling for observables, and conclude 
therefore that those desiring to migrate are selected in terms of higher income earning 
potential. 
 
If international migrants are selected from households who already have high 
earning potential, and their migration in turn raises income earning and through 
remittances adds to the income of the household in the origin area, it should be clear that 
such migration would tend to increase inequality in the sending country.  However, to the 
extent that the selection goes the other way, inequality in the sending country will be 
mitigated by international migration.  There is now a considerable literature on assessing 
directly the impact of international migration on inequality, and we now turn to an 
overview of those studies. 
 
The empirical results on international migration and inequality are inconclusive as 
a whole.  Barham and Boucher (1998) compare the actual distribution post migration 
including remittances for Nicaragua, with a counterfactual of what the distribution would 
have been had the migrants not left and earned their original income.  They found that the 
Gini coefficient is higher by 12%.  Adams (2006) finds a much smaller increase in the 
Gini for Ghana, of 3%.  The difference made by the counterfactual approach is illustrated 
by comparing the findings of De and Ratha (2005) and Karunaratne (2008) for Sri Lanka. 
Using the 2003/4 Socioecononmic Survey for Sri Lanka, Karunaratne (2008) shows that 
“income receivers belonging to lowest 10 percent receives 1.3 percent of their income as 
remittances while 10 percent of the income receivers getting 4.6 percent of their income 
from remittances.”  He uses this to argue that remittances increase inequality.  However, 
De and Ratha (2005) conduct counterfactual analysis and show that remittance income 
exceeds the counterfactual loss in income from migrating in the bottom two deciles, 
while the opposite is true for the top two deciles.  Thus, they argue, remittances are 
equalizing. 
 
A major issue in the empirical literature is the difference between short term and 
long term effects of international migration on inequality.  An early study by Stark, 
 
 
29
Taylor and Ytzhaki (1986) found a positive relationship between remittances and 
inequality in the short term, but the opposite result in the long run for Mexico. 
24McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) argue that while in the short term migration selectivity 
favors better off because of the costs of migration, in the longer term these costs fall as 
migration networks form in the destination country.  Using again the case of migration 
from Mexico to the United States, they argue that migration reduces inequality in 
communities which have experienced high levels of migration in the past.  There may 
thus be an inverse-U relationship between international migration and inequality—first 
increasing and then decreasing. 
 
Overall, then, the final effect of globalization on inequality in developing 
countries through the channel of international migration is ambiguous in theory, and this 
is reflected in the conflicting empirical findings.  These results pick up on a theme of this 
paper as a whole, namely that the consequences for distribution depend on the context, 
and in particular on preexisting structural inequalities.  When these inequalities are high 
and interact with the opportunities presented by globalization in such a way as to 
advantage those already well off, inequality will increase.  The next section turns to the 
policy implications of these findings.25 
 
 
8.  National and Global Policy Responses 
 
Globalization brings enormous benefits, but in its wake it also brings significant 
risks.  The risk of rising inequality has been ever present in the recent globalization 
discourse, where the concern has been that far from delivering “growth with equity” as it 
seems to have done for East Asia in the 1970s and 1970s, the more recent push to global 
integration has been accompanied by rising inequality.  Indeed, those parts of the world 
which have avoided rising inequality like Latin America seem to have done so through 
purposive policy intervention.  What, then, are the policy implications of the association 
between globalization and rising inequality? 
 
It helps to begin by accepting that inequality is indeed a legitimate concern for 
policy makers.  Although not universal, there appears to be a broad consensus that rising 
inequality lowers social welfare directly because societies are inequality averse, and 
indirectly because higher inequality can impede investment and growth through a number 
of channels.26  This is true of standard interpersonal inequality, as well as inequality 
between broadly defined groups such as gender, regions or ethnicities.  Policy makers 
                                                 
24 The analysis is based on simulating the effects of increased remittances on inequality for two villages, 
one of which has longstanding migration patterns to the US and the other of which does not. 
25 There is a large literature on the impact of immigration on inequalities in the host developed countries, 
but that is not covered in this paper. For example, Borjas (2003) is the leading analyst arguing that 
immigration worsens inequality by lowering the relative wages of domestic low skilled workers in the US, 
while Card (2009) has argued that the impact of immigration on relative wages is small and that it accounts 
for as small as 5% of the increase in US age inequality between 1980 and 2000. 
26 This paper is not the place for a review of this vast literature. A recent representative contribution is by 
Berg and Ostry (2011). Evidence for the detrimental effect of gender inequality and growth is presented in 
World Bank (2012). The effects of inequality and growth are covered in Chapter 15 of this volume. 
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appear to be well aware of and concerned about inequality.  For example, in a survey of 
more than 500 Asian policy makers44% rated concern in their country about inequality as 
being “high” or “very high”, while 36% rated the concern as being “medium.”  In answer 
to the question, is higher income inequality acceptable so long as poverty is declining, 
52% disagreed or strongly disagreed.  Finally, in answer to the question how important is 
it to have policies in place to prevent rises in inequality in order to maintain stability and 
sustain growth, 95% said it was “important” or “very important.”27 
 
The next step in the argument is to understand that the inequality of market 
outcomes depends on structural inequality and on how these inequalities interact with 
market processes to exacerbate or mitigate these inequalities.  Thus policy can affect the 
inequality of final outcomes in three ways—addressing structural inequality pre market, 
addressing the operation of market processes, and redistributing of income generated by 
structure and market.  Viewed in this way, the component parts of globalization—
opening up of trade, capital and labor flows—can be seen as dimensions of market 
processes.  Reversing these processes in order to manage inequality is neither desirable, 
since it also blocks off a major route to economic growth and efficiency, nor might it be 
feasible given the instruments that policy makers actually have.  Of course, to the extent 
that the market processes are themselves distorted, for example, preferential access to 
foreign markets for monopolies or for politically favored groups, then addressing these 
can improve efficiency and equity.  But policy could fruitfully focus on addressing 
structural inequalities and redistributing of market income more equitably.  Sometimes 
these can be combined, and redistribution of market income can be done in such a way as 
to mitigate structural inequalities as well. 
 
A good entry point into policy is provided by the contrasting experiences of Asia 
and Latin America in the last twenty years, when both regions have faced the same global 
economy and increases in global integration.  During the 1990s and 2000s, Asia saw 
sharp increases in inequality.  During this period 83% of developing Asia’s population 
lived in countries with rising inequality, and if the high growth that occurred had taken 
place without rising inequality, on one estimate around a quarter of a billion more people 
would have been lifted out of poverty.28  On the other hand, Latin America which has 
long been a byword for high inequality, managed to have a remarkable period of 
declining inequality from the late 1990s onwards.  This is true of all the major Latin 
American economies.  In Brazil, for example, for Brazil between 1998 and 2009, without 
the fall in inequality the same level of poverty reduction would have require a growth rate 
of 4 percentage points higher.29  Of course, the levels of inequality in Latin America were 
and still are much higher than those in Asia. But the difference in trends is remarkable—
“growth with equity” now seems to be found in Latin America, not Asia. 
 
Sections 3 and 4 discussed the skill bias that characterizes technical progress 
today.  Demand for skilled labor is rising globally, and openness in trade and investment 
is transmitting this global demand to the country level.  In the absence of policy 
                                                 
27 Kanbur and Zhuang  (2012), p 44. 
28 Kanbur and Zhuang (2012), p. 41.  
29 Lustig, Ortiz-Juarez and Lopez-Calva (2011).  
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intervention, these market processes will lead to rising inequality within countries.  As 
discussed earlier, closing off economies to in order to block this channel of inequality 
increase is neither feasible nor desirable.  However, Asian economies have tended not to 
counteract these pressures, either through addressing structural inequalities in skill levels, 
or through redistributing market income sufficiently to mitigate inequality.  But Latin 
American economies have purposively redistributed income through cash transfers and 
done it in such a way to help the buildup of human capital through conditioning these 
transfers on keeping children in school.  This is not the place for a full blown assessment 
of conditional cash transfers (CCTS), but it does seem as though Latin American 
countries have found an appropriate intervention to address rising inequality in general 
but also for the current conjuncture of globalization led pressures in rising inequality 
through a rising demand for skilled labor.30 
 
The additional expenditure on conditional cash transfers requires revenues, and 
the progressivity of the tax system is another major determinant of how globalization 
related increases in inequality can be mitigated.  But progressivity is also important in 
addressing the rise in very high incomes the world over, especially in Asia.  Asian tax 
systems do not generally score highly on progressivity.  In fact, it is argued that raising 
progressivity of taxation would have a bigger impact on inequality than elsewhere in the 
world. 31  
 
The policy discussion above is pertinent to rises in inequality associated with 
globalization, but it is of course also valid for increases in inequality from any source. 
What globalization brings, however is the easier movement of capital and labor across 
borders, and this may well constrain government’s abilities to raise revenues to address 
structural inequalities and to redistribute market incomes.  There is now a large literature 
on tax competition and the globalization’s role in intensifying the “race to the bottom.” 
Kanbur and Keen (1993) show that tax rates are (i) sub-optimal with lack of tax 
coordination when tax base is mobile across borders and (ii) the sub-optimality increases 
with the ease of movement of tax base.  With such revenue effects, questions are 
naturally raised about the sustainability of redistributive expenditure like CCTS in a 
globalized world.  As the title of a recent paper asks, “will social welfare expenditures 
survive tax competition?” (Hines, 2006)32. 
 
The basic intuitions of the analysis can be applied to progressive income taxation 
as well in the context of international migration.  The discussion in Section 7 showed that 
international migration was unequivocally good for poverty reduction in developing 
countries, and while there were possible short run effects raising inequality, these were 
turned around in the medium term.  This would argue for greater freedom of international 
migration of labor to match the greater ease of movement of goods and capital.  
However, there is a catch.  The possibility of international migration, especially of skilled 
                                                 
30 For an overview see Fiszbein and Schady (2009). It is of course clear that CCTs by themselves and alone 
are not responsible for the trend of inequality in Latin America. 
31 Asian Development Bank (2012), p. 76. 
32 See also Hines and Summers (2009). 
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high income labor, could constrain the government’s abilities to redistribute within the 
country through progressive taxation. 
 
The early work of Mirrlees (1982) concluded that “it may well be desirable to 
institute substantial income taxes on foreign earnings.”33  While this was the solution for 
a single country’s tax design problem when faced with cross-border migration, it also 
contains within the seeds of a solution to the coordination problem, whereby countries 
follow each other down the path of reduced progressivity, exacerbating the inequality 
impact of greater openness.  A similar logic applies to a race to the bottom on labor 
standards, where countries either lower standards or enforcement in order to gain 
competitive advantage (Chau and Kanbur, 2003, 2006).  The issue has already been 
alluded to in the context of gender inequality, in the context of footloose industries which 
employ mainly women.  Coordination on labor standards is typically conducted through 
the International Labor Organization and this mechanism can be strengthened further to 
address the inequality increasing forces that globalization can bring (Chau and Kanbur, 
2001).  
 
Indeed, Basu (2006) goes so far as to propose an international agency to address 
this issue: 
 
“That there may be coordination problems in trade is well recognized and we 
have the WTO to help mitigate such problems.  That labor market policies need 
coordination is known and we have the ILO to address this.  For environmental problems 
we have the UNEP or the GEF.  But there is nothing comparable to these for anti-poverty 
and anti-inequality policies.  Yet….this is an area where the coordination problem may 
be no less acute.  Hence, there is clearly a perceived need for a coordinating agency.” 
 
Leaving to one side the political feasibility or operational practicality of such an 
agency, the fact it is even being contemplated highlights like nothing else the challenges 
that globalization poses to policy makers concerned with its effects on inequality. 
 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
The effects of globalization and inequality have animated much theoretical, 
empirical and policy literature since the Second World War, but particularly so in the last 
thirty years when, contrary to some received wisdom, greater global integration was 
associated with increasing inequality in developed and especially in developing countries. 
In the wake of the new facts, theory has responded, particularly with a class of models 
which emphasize selection mechanisms into production and trade, thereby allowing 
inequality to increase everywhere with openness.  These new models will need to be 
developed and fleshed out, and applied in different contexts of trade, investment and 
outsourcing. Empirical work will depend on the availability of high quality firm level 
                                                 
33 There is now a huge literature on migration and optimal income taxation. A recent example which 
illustrates many of the intricacies is Hamilton and Pestieau (2005). 
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data, and there will need to be considerable investment in the generation of such data, 
particularly for low income countries. 
 
Inequality is not just interpersonal inequality but inequality across broadly defined 
groups—gender, and regional being prime examples, but ethno-linguistic groupings (not 
covered in this survey) are another dimension along which inequality is a key policy 
concern.  Further empirical work will need to document the impact of different aspects of 
globalization on these dimensions of inequality, and theorizing will need to extend and 
modify the standard Hecksher-Ohlin model, or indeed the more recent selection based 
models, to incorporate structural divides along salient socio-economic groupings. 
 
At the level of national policy the addressing of the inequality consequences of 
globalization is in principle no different to the addressing the inequality consequences of 
other forces such as technical progress (although global integration tightens the 
transmission mechanism from technical change in one part of the world to another). 
However, greater mobility of goods, capital and labor constrains the freedom of 
governments to mitigate inequality through redistributive instruments.  More research is 
needed in order to delineate, in theoretical and empirical terms, the nature of these 
constraints and the gains of global coordination on tax and expenditure policy and on 
labor and capital regulation.  In the realm of practical policy there is also a fairly full 
agenda, ranging from the implementation of redistributive schemes like Conditional Cash 
Transfers at the national level, and the use of existing global institutions like the ILO and 
the WTO to put a floor on a race to the bottom in taxation and redistribution at the 
international level. 
 
Having animated the economic analysis and policy discourse for the past half 
century, globalization-inequality nexus seems set to continue doing so in the coming five 
decades.
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